Cutting the Cord: Leveling the Playing Field for Virtual Cable Companies by Johnson, Camille Marie
Seton Hall University
eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship Seton Hall Law
5-1-2014
Cutting the Cord: Leveling the Playing Field for
Virtual Cable Companies
Camille Marie Johnson
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Recommended Citation
Johnson, Camille Marie, "Cutting the Cord: Leveling the Playing Field for Virtual Cable Companies" (2014). Law School Student
Scholarship. 497.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/497
 1 
Advanced Entertainment Law Seminar 
Fall 2013 
 
Cutting the Cord: Leveling the Playing Field for Virtual Cable Companies 
 
Camille M. Johnson 1 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The oligopolistic playground of today’s cable companies is being threatened by the 
increasing popularity of television accessed by millions via the Internet.  The outdated 
frameworks of cable and satellite companies, also known as multichannel video programming 
distributors  (“MVPDs”), are waning in comparison to the reach and convenience of  the 
Internet.  
Naturally, the Internet is the expanding frontier in the television distribution industry and 
has grown to be the preferred method of viewing programming content.  Anticompetitive 
behavior on the part of the MVPDs, however, has served to stifle new Internet television 
providers, particularly virtual cable companies.  Restrictive agreements between content 
programmers and the MVPDs prevent content creators from striking the most economically 
sound distribution deals, the fallout of which negatively impacts the consumer.  
Internet television providers have been at the mercy of the leverage and bargaining power 
of the MVPDs, driven by cable, satellite and fiber optics companies such as Comcast, Time 
Warner Cable, Dish, Direct TV, Verizon and AT&T.  These MVPDs not only control the 
distribution of programming content but they also control and are primary distributors of Internet 
broadband connection, often bundling packages and manipulating prices to discourage MVPD 
subscribers from canceling their cable subscriptions.  Government intervention is necessary to 
 2 
allow for the entrance of virtual cable companies into the multi-channel video programming 
industry.  Expansion of the compulsory licensing scheme under the Copyright Act would be 
most effective in achieving this goal. 
This paper addresses the issues surrounding the anticompetitive behavior of MVPDs and 
possible solutions in favor of the Internet television providers in four parts.  Part I addresses the 
beginnings of cable television and the establishment of the pay-TV distribution network.  Part II 
explores the increasing popularity of Internet television today and the difficulties faced in 
gaining traction in the MVPD dominated marketplace.  Part III addresses MVPD content 
lockouts other anticompetitive tactics in response to a growth in popularity of online television. 
Part IV recommends legislative reform and policy solutions that will enable Internet television 
companies to participate on a level playing field with the existing MVPDs. 
 
I. The Establishment of the MVPD Framework 
Cable television was developed in response to a need to broadcast to households located 
outside of the reach of the broadcast signals.
2 
 Cable companies were established to retransmit 
the broadcasters’ signals by way of cable line, which were in essence “performances” of 
copyrighted works.  Technically as performances of copyrighted works, a cable company would 
be required to negotiate licenses for each retransmission.
3 
 
A. Copyright Act Exemption for MVPDs 
Within the Copyright Act enacted in 1976, an exemption was made for cable companies, 
in that they need not have to negotiate individual licenses for retransmission and could simply 
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pay a fee set by the government for compulsory licensing of the content to be rebroadcast to 
cable subscribers.
4
  
 
Specifically, Section 111 of the Copyright Act provides:  
Secondary transmissions to the public by a cable system of 
a performance or display of a work embodied in a primary 
transmission made by a broadcast station licensed by the Federal 
Communications Commission…  shall be subject to statutory 
licensing upon compliance with the requirements of subsection (d) 
where the carriage of the signals comprising the secondary 
transmission is permissible under the rules, regulations, or 
authorizations of the Federal Communications Commission.
5
  
 
Subsequently, satellite companies were added to cable companies in qualifying for 
the exemption under the Copyright Act by way of the Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988, Title 
II, Pub. L. No. 100-667.
6
   This Act allowed satellite companies to enter the market and compete 
in the content distribution market along with the existing cable companies.
7
 Satellite companies 
such as Dish and DirecTV control approximately 25% of the market.
8
 Telephone companies are 
the most recent entrant to this content distribution scheme and have been added to the 
compulsory licensing scheme.
9  
Telephone companies such as AT&T utilize fiber optics 
technology and control approximately 11% of the market.
10
  
 
 
B. Broadcast vs. Non-Broadcast Programmers 
MVPDs distribute both broadcast and non-broadcast content. Broadcast content is 
developed by the major content programmers, such as ABC, NBC, Fox and CBS.  These 
companies are available to the public for free over the airwaves by antennae and are distributed 
by the MVPDs under the compulsory licensing exemption scheme.  However, MVPDs are 
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required to obtain Retransmission Consent from broadcast programmers as part of a 1992 
compromise within the Cable Television and Consumer Protection Act, in order to rebroadcast 
the signal which is separate in theory from rebroadcasting copyrightable content.  In order to 
extract additional fees from the MVPDs, broadcast programmers bundle their own smaller non-
broadcast companies to be distributed through MVPDs under separate negotiated licensing 
agreements.
11 
Non-broadcast companies develop content that can only be accessed through an MVPD 
subscription.  These non-broadcast companies include Time Warner, which owns CNN, TNT 
and TBS, and then Viacom owns MTV, VH1, Spike, Comedy Central, BET and others.
12 
Distributors in some cases own their content creators, a prime example being Time Warner 
Cable’s parent-subsidiary relationship with its programmers and Comcast who owns 
NBCUniversal.  This relationship is referred to as vertical integration, which serves as a basis for 
the centralization of bargaining power within the MVPD landscape.
13
 
The MVPDs negotiate with non-broadcast programmers for carriage on their networks. 
Smaller cable programmers on the outside of the vertical integration scheme are often integrated 
by being forced into unfavorable agreements with the MVPDs.  In order to be distributed by the 
MVPDs, smaller content creators are often obligated to sell significant shares of stock to the 
MVPD and as a result become part of the vertical integration scheme.
14
  
This sort of vertical integration allows MVPDs direct control over the content of their 
subsidiaries and the subsidiaries’ ability to negotiate web-based streaming deals.15  Contract 
terms weigh heavily in favor of the MVPDs, which include “most favored nation” clauses which 
“grant the distributors the benefit of any contract negotiated with a rival distributor.”  This is 
done to ensure Internet television companies cannot fairly compete with MVPDs.  A resistance 
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to this sort of scheme by the smaller cable programmers may result in being “blackballed” by 
other distributors.
16
 
 
C. MVPD Usage Trends 
The most recent data on usage shows that MVPD subscribers constitute 83 percent of 
American households, a decrease from 92 percent just five years prior.
17
  The shifting consumer 
behavior is fully apparent in the numbers.  According to Bloomberg’s Ian King,  “The impact on 
the $80 billion pay-TV industry is already being felt, with 2013 on pace to be the first year ever 
that total U.S. pay-TV subscriptions will decline, falling to 100.8 million from 100.9 million last 
year.  And while 3.2 million new U.S. households were set up in the last three years, the paid-TV 
industry only added 250,000 subscriptions in that same period.”18  Although the growth of 
MVPDs has slowed, they continue to dominate the content distribution marketplace.  The lack of 
competition in this industry has resulted in inflated subscription rates, even in light of the 
abysmal customer satisfaction ratings.
19 
 Programmers only receive about a third of what the 
MVPDs collect from subscribers and make up the rest of their revenues through advertising 
fees.
20
 
With their broadband Internet distribution capabilities, MVPDs bundle their cable 
subscription services with their broadband services offered to consumers making it difficult for 
consumers to transition to Internet only.  This forced dynamic increases rates on broadband if the 
customer decides to cancel their cable subscription.  “Today, cable operators make between fifty 
percent and sixty percent of their revenues form their MVPD service, while the balance comes 
from Internet access and phone services.  They would make less money, all else equal, if 
consumers paid them only for Internet access.”21  
 6 
The rates on bundled services have increased steadily year to year.  A report released by 
the FCC noted that “under the current bundling regime, cable prices have increased by an 
average of 4.6% per year and in excess of 7% per year for the expanded basic program tier over 
the past five years, pointing to the industry’s practice of making most networks as available as 
part of a bundle tier-- as a potential reason for the rise in rates.”22 
Entry costs to establishing a cable or satellite company are very high, creating barriers of 
entry for MVPDs who wish to enter the market by a more traditional route utilizing physical 
equipment.  Beside the cost of the physical equipment needed to deliver content, this year alone 
MPVDs “will spend $45 billion to secure the most attractive programming.  That compares to a 
projected $2.4 billion to be spent by Netflix, which accounts for the majority of online services 
purchasing content.”23  MPVDs are at risk to lose a substantial portion of market share if Internet 
television providers are able to gain real footing in the industry.  As the threat of cord cutting 
rises, so do the defense mechanisms and anticompetitive tactics of the MPVDs in their attempt to 
maintain status quo.
24 
 
II. The Rise of Internet Television 
Viewing television content has grown exponentially in popularity since broadband 
capabilities made it easy to view video over the home Internet connection.  Companies operating 
in the online television setting are available in a variety of business models, including 
“subscription, per-episode fees, advertiser supported, or some combination.”25  
More generally, the current Internet television industry can be divided into two 
categories: the online content distributors and the companies that produce online content 
streaming devices.  Although there are many online content distributors, there are no existing 
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virtual cable companies.  Virtual cable companies would in effect operate as direct competitors 
to existing MVPDs.  However, because of the inability of virtual cable companies providers to 
carry television stations (in most part at the hands of the MVPDs) virtual cable companies will 
not be able to enter the market as a viable channel viewing product. 
 
A. The Leading Online Content Distributors: 
1. Netflix: This online distributor was established in 1999 as a mail order DVD 
movie service, although founders had their sights on an Internet content 
streaming service (hence the name Netflix as opposed to Postflix!
26
)   In 2007, 
Netflix implemented its Watch Instantly service which soon became the primary 
section of growth and revenue for the company consisting of both movies and 
television shows.  As of the third financial quarter 2013, Netflix served 40.3 
million subscribers with earnings of $32 million.  Currently, the subscription fee 
for consumers is $7.99. Recent growth has been attributed to the release of 
Netflix original programming such as jailhouse drama “Orange is the New 
Black” and political clincher “House of Cards”.27  
 
2. Hulu: Established in 2008, Hulu is the primary online distributor of broadcast 
television programming.  This online content company distributes programming 
owned by the joint venturers: Comcast, 21
st
 Century Fox Corporation and The 
Walt Disney Company.
28 
 In 2010 Hulu created a premium service, Hulu Plus, 
for $7.99 per month.  Hulu currently has approximately 4 million subscribers and 
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generated $695 million in revenue in 2012 between subscriptions and 
advertisers.
29
 
 
3. YouTube: This content provider has become the primary source for user-
generated video on the Internet.  Established in 2005, Google purchased 
YouTube in 2006 for $1.65 billion.  Although most of the content is user 
generated, corporations such as CBS and BBC participate in a corporate 
partnership program with YouTube.  Through these partnerships, viewers can 
watch content.
30
 
 
B. Leading Internet Television Streaming Devices: 
1. Apple TV: This is a device that enables the consumer to watch content from 
online distributors on a conventional television.  Consumers can watch content 
and also purchase new programming straight from the iTunes store.  The 
Airplay component of the device differentiates it from similar online content to 
television devices in that it pushes content from other Apple products such as 
the iPhone and iPad and screen mirroring capability with Mountain Lion 
enabled laptops.  The Apple TV currently retails for $99.
31
 
 
2. Roku: Similar to the Apple TV, Roku is also a content streaming device.  Since 
its joining with Netflix in 2008, Roku has climbed to use in 37 percent of 
streaming households compared with 24 percent using Apple TV.  The device 
ranges from $50 to $100.  Roku, “which generates revenue through hardware 
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sales, advertising, and channel subscription fees, made over $100 million in 
sales last year.”32  
 
3. Vudu: Acquired by Walmart in 2010, Vudu is a content delivery system, which 
is delivered through an add-on device form and through subscription.  It 
operates an “online library of HD movies,” and “enables users to stream movies 
and watch on Sony PlayStation3, Blu-ray players, HDTV’s, PC’s or Macs, TVs, 
and home theatres.”33 
 
4. Chromecast: This is the most recent device to appear on the market with its 
debut on July 24, 2013.  The Chromecast is a media-streaming adapter in the 
form of a dongle. A dongle is a small device that plugs into a computer or high 
definition television and serves as an adapter to enable the streaming of content 
to high definition enabled televisions.  Chromecast enables Google Play Music, 
Google Play Movies & TV, YouTube and Netflix.  Most recently Hulu Plus and 
Pandora Radio have been enabled on the device.
34
 
 
C. The Growth of the Cord Cutters and Cord Nevers in Response to Internet TV 
“Cord cutters” and “cord nevers” are currently the biggest threat to the current 
MVPD model, relying entirely on the content that they are able to stream by way of their Internet 
access and specialty streaming devices.  Cord nevers are of particular concern to cable 
companies.  Consisting mostly of tech savvy “20-somethings”, cord nevers have never 
subscribed to a traditional MVPD service, but rather choose to stream content over Internet 
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connection.  “It’s hard not to be concerned that there’s a growing population growing up not 
using pay-TV.  Alternatives are growing by the day,” as quoted by media research analyst Rich 
Greenfield of BTIG Research.
35
 
 Cord cutters are “customers that once bought traditional cable or satellite TV 
subscriptions, yet have since cut the cord, as it were, and now rely mainly on the programming 
they can access by way of the Internet.”36  “Both groups affect the cable industry, which is 
unlikely to return to the growth in customer numbers it once enjoyed,” as quoted by analyst Ian 
Olgeirson of SNL Kagan.
37  
“According to the Consumer Electronics Association’s (CEA) latest “U.S. Household 
Television Usage” report, the number of U.S. households that receive cable TV programming 
through cable, satellite, and fiber connections has fallen to 83%- down from 88% in 2010. The 
CEA cited non-TV devices such as computers, tablets, and smartphones, as well as streaming 
services as a major factor in the drop in cable subscribed households.”38 Cord cutters and cord 
nevers today stand at 19 percent of the population, approximately 11 percent claim to be cord 
cutters while the other 8 percent claim to be cord nevers.
39 
 
D. Virtual Cable Television- A More Efficient Business Model 
 Virtual cable companies would be able to offer consumers something that MVPDs 
cannot, which is meaningful choice in the movies and television series consumers choose to 
watch at a much lower cost.  Virtual cable companies would have the luxury of avoiding 
exorbitant costs of entry and infrastructure building, keeping costs of subscriptions low.  
Traditional MPVDs, in turn, would have to lower their subscription fees in order to compete with  
virtual cable companies. 
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 Virtual cable companies would also allow smaller programmers to compete and 
garner the best deals without being forced to sign over their equity interest to the MVPDs. 
“Programmers could go directly to consumers without cutting a deal with the MVPD.  As a 
result, programmers would have greater leverage in negotiating with the MVPD, as programmers 
could reach an audience without being wholly dependent on a few powerful distributors.”40 A 
robust online market would allow broadcasters and non-broadcasters alike better distribution 
options.  
 
III. Anti-Competition- Cable’s Stronghold on Distribution 
 A great deal of gatekeeping and anti-competitive behavior on the part of the MVPDs 
has kept virtual cable companies from flourishing in the marketplace.  Content lock-outs and 
crafty agreements have been blamed for online television’s current state.  Lock-out strategies are 
simply one aspect of a long history of anti-competitive behavior in the industry.  “Historically, 
incumbent dominant distributors of any content, for any medium, have tried to stifle emerging 
competitors by denying them content, almost invariably requiring government action to protect 
competition.”41 
 
A. The History of Anticompetitive Practices Within the Industry 
When cable television entered the market, broadcasters attempted to suppress its 
operations by denying the cable companies the ability to retransmit programming.  Government 
intervention, in the form of the Copyright Act, was necessary to enable cable companies to 
compete freely in the marketplace.  
 12 
The same form of suppression was a reality for satellite companies when they entered the 
market in the 1980’s.  At that time it was the cable companies, that were locked out by 
broadcasters, who were now seeking to block satellite companies from the market.  Once again, 
the government intervened adding to the legislation the exemption of satellite companies as well 
as cable companies under compulsory licensing schemes.
42  
History repeated itself once again 
with the arrival of phone companies entering the market as distributors, and once again the 
government had to intervene.
 
 
B. Internet Distribution Restrictions and the Suppression of Intel’s Virtual Cable Service 
“Just as the broadcasters attempted to lock out cable operators, and as cable operators 
attempted to lock out both satellite operators and phone carriers, all three incumbent MVPD 
industries seek to lock out internet enabled competition.”43  The MVPDs are now actively trying 
to suppress the creation of a virtual cable company in development by Intel.  The service that 
Intel is preparing to distribute is one that streams dozens of channels that can be found on MVPD 
services, over the existing broadband Internet infrastructure.  
This model is unlike any Internet streaming service already in existence in that there is no 
current MVPD type service available over the Internet.  The prospect presents the most ominous 
threat to the existing MVPD stronghold.  Although there has been no announcement as to what 
programmers have signed up to be distributed through Intel, Intel has made it clear that they 
would be willing to pay more than other distributors for the acquisition of channels for its 
service.  “The distributors are using a variety of methods to pressure the owners of cable 
channels, which whom they have lucrative long-term contracts, not to sign contracts with 
upstarts like Intel, that way preserving the status quo.”44 
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MVPDs have been a significant factor in the programmers’ apprehension and it comes 
down to the distribution contracts signed with the MVPDs, “Some contracts include clauses that 
expressly prohibit the channels to be sold to an Internet distributor like Intel, while other 
contracts merely discourage such competition by including financial incentives or penalties.  So-
called most favored nations clauses, which are common, exist to ensure that is another distributor 
receives a cheaper rate for a channel later, that rate applies across the board.”  Intel needs a 
substantial number of channels to break loose from these anticompetitive restraints and sign on 
to the burgeoning virtual cable company, before they can move forward as a viable service.
45 
The second largest cable company, Time Warner Cable (“TWC”), has been held to be the 
most aggressive when it comes to content blocking.  Time Warner’s stance is simply that 
exclusivity is not anticompetitive as was articulated by a TWC spokeswoman, “Exclusivities and 
windows are extremely common in the entertainment industry.  It’s absurd to suggest that in 
today’s highly competitive video marketplace, obtaining some level of exclusivity is 
anticompetitive.”46  
Richard Greenfield of BTIG Research rejects such an assertion, “They are not paying for 
exclusivity.  They are saying you can sell to X, to Y, and Z, but you are forbidden from selling to 
this new class called A.”47  Time Warner regularly pays off programmer to prevent web-based 
streaming.
48 
 “Incentives to lock-out content providers from streaming their properties online 
include monetary bonuses and threats to drop programming.”49 
Even without the lock-out strategies looming over Intel, Verizon has shown interest in 
buying the project out. It is not clear whether Verizon intends to continue to develop the concept 
of virtual cable television, or is simply attempting to quash a possible competitor. According to 
Peter Kafka and Arik Hesseldahl, “If Intel seemed like an odd place for a Web TV project, 
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Verizon makes plenty of sense, at least on paper: It has relationships and reach that Intel never 
had. Verizon already serves up conventional pay TV to more than five million subscribers via its 
FiOs unit, and sells broadband access to nearly six million subscribers.”50 
This move by Verizon may turn out to be a step in the right direction toward a supporting 
a viable virtual cable television model, or it may be the end of Intel’s effort toward launching a 
successful product.  
 
C. Government Oversight and the Justice Department’s Antitrust Probe 
 All of the aforementioned anticompetitive behavior, in addition to a number of other 
practices on the part of the MVPDs has drawn the attention of the Justice Department, who 
began a broad investigation into the restrictive practices of the MVPD industry.  The focus of the 
investigation is possible antitrust issues associated with such anticompetitive practices and the 
exploration of the possibility that MVPDs are “acting improperly to quash nascent competition 
from online video.”51 
 One year prior to the commencement of the Justice Department’s probe into the 
MVPD industry, consumers of Time Warner Cable brought suit against the company for what 
they perceived to be antitrust violations.  In re Set Top Television Box Anti-Trust Litigation 
plaintiff customers of Time Warner Cable company filed suit against Time Warner Cable for an 
unlawful “tying” arrangement which requires customers to rent cable boxes at exorbitant rates, in 
order to access “Premium Cable Services” provided by Time Warner.52 
“A tying arrangement is an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the 
condition that the buyer also purchases a different or tied product, or at least agrees that he will 
not purchase that product from any other supplier.” 53 The court cited that, “The essential 
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characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement lies in the seller’s exploitation of its control over 
the tying product to force the buyer into the purchase of the tied product that the buyer either did 
not want at all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms.” 54 
Plaintiffs in this case allege Sherman Act antitrust violations with regard to the bundling 
of products, tying the cable service to the expensive rental of the set-top box which a customer 
can just as easily buy directly from the set-top box manufacturers.
55
 They make the argument 
that Time Warner Cable uses the boxes to force customers into unnecessary fees and is in 
essence a restrictive practice.  
The court in response to the complaint enters an analysis exploring the tying claims and 
applying the relevant standard: “Plaintiffs asserting an illegal tying arrangement must plausibly 
allege first, a tying and a tied product; second, evidence of actual coercion by a seller that forced 
the buyer to accept the tied product.”56The court focuses it’s analysis on the third factor being, 
“sufficient economic power in the tying product market to coerce purchaser acceptance of the 
tied product.” The last two factors taken into consideration are, “anticompetitive effects in the 
tied market: and fifth, the involvement of a ‘not substantial’ amount of interstate commerce in 
the tied market.”57 
The court accepts the argument that Time Warner Cable is participating in product tying 
in order to coerce customers into paying for multiple products in order to receive one.
58
  The 
court here however takes issue with the satisfaction of the third factor.  In order to prove that 
Time Warner cable was acting in a way to be in violation of the Sherman Act, the plaintiffs had 
to show that Time Warner by itself had sufficient economic power in the tying product market to 
coerce purchaser acceptance of the tied product.
59
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In this case, the court cites that the plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of proving 
that Time Warner Cable by itself garnered the competitive power and market strength to affect 
the market with their tying tactics.
60
 The court found that plaintiffs’ assertions of Time Warner 
Cable’s market power were in the aggregate, and insufficient to support a claim of violation of 
the Sherman Act.
61
 Although the plaintiffs did not prevail against Time Warner Cable in this 
case, it does serve as a precursor to the current Justice Department probe that is exploring  the 
restrictive practices of the entire MVPD industry. 
 The Justice Department probe has directed its investigation to a number of 
concerning areas.  Investigators are scrutinizing the use of data-caps that a number of MPVDs 
have implemented to limit the streaming capabilities of its subscribers.  There are concerns that 
this practice is aimed at discouraging subscribers from discontinuing their cable service in favor 
of cord cutting.
62
  
In particular, Comcast has come under fire for its data-cap policy over its broadband 
Internet connection, because it made an exception for its own video viewing application on the 
Xbox which it did not subject to data-caps.  This action appears to have been in violation of an 
agreement made with the Justice Department in securing antitrust approval of its takeover of 
NBCUniversal.  “Under the terms of the settlement, Comcast agreed it would not ‘unreasonably 
discriminate’ against other companies transmitting data over its pipes, or treat its own content 
differently.”63 
The Justice Department is also investigating whether cable, and fiber optics companies 
are “acting anticompetitively by making viewers have a cable subscription before being able to 
access certain online programming.”64 This is a very common practice in the industry today, with 
many cable companies taking it even a step further by requiring subscribers to be within the 
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reach of the Internet access they receive in their bundled package in order to stream online 
programming provided by the MVPD.
65
 This practice falls under the tying practices found in the 
In re Set-Top Cable Television Antitrust case. 
Most importantly, the Justice Department is investigating the legality of the contracts 
forged between the MVPDs and the programmers, in order for programmers to gain distribution. 
The Justice Department cites most favored nations clauses, roping programmers into offering the 
MVPDs the best deal available, as problematic.  “The Justice Department is questioning whether 
there are legitimate business reasons for such terms or whether they are intended to stop 
programmers from experimenting with other forms of online distribution.”66 
Although the report on the Justice Department’s investigation into the practices of the 
MVPD industry has not yet been released, mere existence of an investigation by the Justice 
Department into the MVPDs unwieldy business practices is indicative of some level of wrong 
doing on the part of the MVPDs.  Whether they surface from this investigation with clean hands 
is something yet to be seen; however, if the Justice Department takes all of the MVPD 
anticompetitive tactics into consideration, it will be clear that the MVPDs are using their 
unbridled power to suffocate any flicker of virtual cable competition. 
 
IV. Compulsory Licensing, Retransmissions, and the Need for Legislative Reform 
 Extension of the compulsory licensing exemption under the Copyright Act to virtual 
cable providers may be the solution to creating a more equitable MVPD marketplace. 
Compulsory licensing would provide a nascent industry, such as virtual cable companies, the 
opportunity to compete and vie for programmers and content on the same level as established 
MVPDs.  The most recent and relevant case with respect to compulsory licensing and Internet 
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television providers is WPIX, Inc. v. ivi Inc.  Here,  the  court  had  the opportunity to declare 
Internet broadcast television as a legitimate source of viewing  live  television, however the 
courts took a very narrow and outdated view of  legislative language relating to compulsory 
licensing. 
 
A. Current Litigation in Internet Television 
1. WPIX, Inc. v. ivi Inc. 
 In WPIX, defendant ivi, an online content service, was streaming live broadcasts over 
the Internet of approximately 30 New York and Seattle based broadcast television stations.  
Plaintiff companies who brought suit were: ABC, Disney Enterprises, CBS, The CW Television 
Stations, Inc., Universal Network Television, Telemundo, NBC, and Fox.  A preliminary 
injunction had been issued on ivi to prevent them from streaming the content. The principal issue 
the court addressed, that was raised as an argument by ivi, was whether ivi’s Internet streaming 
service constituted a cable system under the compulsory licensing exemption of the Copyright 
Act.
67 
Section 111(c)(1) of the Copyright Act reads in pertinent part:  
“Secondary transmissions to the public by a cable system of 
a performance or display of a work embodied in a primary 
transmission made by a broadcast station licensed by the Federal 
Communications Commission…  shall be subject to statutory 
licensing upon compliance with the requirements of subsection (d) 
where the carriage of the signals comprising the secondary 
transmission is permissible under the rules, regulations, or 
authorizations of the Federal Communications Commission.”68 
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The definition of “cable system” held special relevance in this case.  As it is defined in 
the statute, a “cable system” is defined as:  
“a facility, located in any State, territory, trust territory, or 
possession of United States, that in whole or in part receives 
signals transmitted or programs broadcast by one or more 
television broadcast stations licensed by the Federal 
Communications Commission, and makes secondary transmissions 
of such signals or programs by wires, cables, microwave, or other 
communications channels to subscribing members of the public 
who pay for such service.  For purposes of determining the royalty 
fee under subsection (d)(1), two or more cable systems in 
contiguous communities under common ownership or control or 
operating from on headend shall be considered as one system.”69 
 
The court explores the literal meaning of the term cable systems and concludes that the 
definition is ambiguous  with respect to Internet television providers, claiming that it is unclear 
whether transmissions over the Internet “is or utilizes the facility, that receives and transmits 
signals, through wire, cables, microwave, or other communication channels.”  The court here 
focuses too narrowly on the literal meaning and glazes over what would stand to be the most 
relevant part of the definition of a “cable system” --the clause referring to “other 
communications channels.”  The legislative inclusion of such language would indicate to any 
reader that the legislature intended to include future conceptions of communication channels, not 
conceived at the time the Act went into effect.  
In its discussion of legislative history the court cites that “compulsory licensing not only 
protects the commercial value of copyrighted works but also enhances the ability of cable 
systems to retransmit such programs… thereby allowing the public to benefit by the wider 
dissemination of works carried on television broadcast signals.”  If this is the purpose of 
compulsory licensing in the context of cable systems, then why would it make sense that the 
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understanding of compulsory licensing should not be extended to Internet TV providers?  What 
would logically follow in a progressive society is that new developments and technologies within 
similar communication channels be afforded the same rights and privileges as what is afforded to 
existing technologies. 
The court ultimately decided that ivi. was not a cable system
70
  and as such was not 
entitled to a compulsory license for their over the Internet broadcasts. ivi was enjoined from 
further retransmissions.  This outcome is indicative of a refusal by the judiciary to view the 
Internet as a viable and legitimate mode for broadcasts.  Ultimately, the only way to allow virtual 
cable companies a fair chance to enter the market place is for Congress to extend the current 
meaning of the compulsory license exemption.  
 
2. Aereo & BarryDriller-- Circuit Split 
A recently decided Second Circuit case, WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, marks the champion 
of Internet television broadcasters.  However, it has simultaneously created a circuit split with 
the Ninth Circuit by way of Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Systems.  Both 
address online redistribution of broadcast network television programs.  Aereo survived judicial 
review, while Fox did not. 
In Aereo, founders of the Internet streaming company developed a new way to transmit 
broadcasts over the Internet to be received by an individual digital antennae device that is 
personal to each subscriber.  The device functions in a was that each digital antennae has its own 
transmitter at the central hub of Aereo. Subscribers have access to both live and recorded 
broadcasts for which they paid a monthly fee.  A number of broadcast companies, including Fox, 
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Univision and the Public Broadcasting Service, brought suit against Aereo for infringing the 
exclusive right of the copyright owners “to perform the copyrighted work publicly.”71 
 In pertinent part 17 U.S.C. §106(4) provides that performing work publicly means:  
(1)To perform or display it at a place open to the public or 
at any place where a substantial number of person outside of a 
normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; 
or  
(2) To transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or 
display of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the 
public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of 
the public capable of receiving the performances or display receive 
it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or 
different times.”72 
 
The court concluded that, “because each subscriber has access to a single copy of a 
broadcast through that single antenna, and no other subscribers can receive a transmission from 
that copy, the Second Circuit held that the transmission did not constitute a public 
performance.”73 In effect, Aereo has used the Internet and a device that sends signals personal to 
the subscriber to get around the question of public performance in broadcast, which would 
require the ability to purchase a compulsory license, as was denied to ivi in the previous case 
resulting in a permanent injunction. 
There were similar facts, yet an opposite outcome in Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. 
BarryDriller Content Systems.  Broadcast television networks brought suit against the 
BarryDriller Content Systems streaming company for infringing their copyrights by 
retransmitting broadcasts using Internet connection. BarryDriller had a similar personal digital 
receiver set-up as the devices at Aereo.  The Ninth Circuit rejected the reasoning in Aereo and 
“enjoined a ‘technologically analogous’ broadcast system.”74 
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The outcomes of these cases have left a split in authority between the Second and Ninth 
Circuits.  Unless there is a restoration of harmony among the circuits, the split may make a good 
case for Supreme Court review. Allowing for Internet television companies to be eligible for 
compulsory licensing would bypass this circuit split and make way for a more fair and 
competitive MVPD marketplace. 
 
B. A Recommendation for Industry-Wide Compulsory Licensing 
 When taking into consideration Internet television companies’ severe lack of 
bargaining power, legislation enacted in favor of the existing MVPD industry and a judiciary 
confused about the influence of Internet television and its far reaching impact on the lives of 
today’s consumers, it is clear that Internet television providers and virtual cable start-ups deserve 
adequate protection once afforded to nascent cable, satellite, and fiber optics companies many 
years ago. Compulsory licensing for both broadcast and non-broadcast programmers should be 
available industry- wide to level the playing field for virtual cable company start-ups. 
On the opposite end of the pro-compulsory licensing position, there is a pro-MVPD 
contingent that believes that all compulsory licensing as it relates to cable, satellite and telephone 
companies, should be repealed.  Preston Padden, former president of ABC and former executive 
vice-president of The Walt Disney Company testified before the Subcommittee on Courts, IP and 
the Internet advocating for the repeal of the compulsory license for MVPDs.
75 
His reasoning is as follows: “Subject to a brief transition period, Congress should repeal 
the cable and satellite compulsory licenses in 17 U.S.C. Sections 111, 119 and 122. At the same 
time Congress should repeal the retransmission consent provision in 47 U.S.C. Section 325 
(b)(1)(A) and legislatively repeal the FCC’s regulations governing network non-duplication, 
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syndicated exclusivity and blackouts.” 76 He insists that, “The end result would be to put cable 
and satellite  distribution of broadcast  television  programs under the same legal regime as  
the distribution  of non- broadcast  programs- namely, simple  free  market copyright  
negotiations.”77 
Mr. Padden makes the claim that repealing the compulsory licensing scheme would in 
fact create a level playing field for any company that seeks to enter the MVPD marketplace.
78
 
The claims made during Mr. Padden’s testimony are simply out of context with the realities of 
the marketplace today.  With the ever-growing pressure of the MVPDs to maintain status quo 
and effectively shut out any viable competitors such as the virtual cable companies, by way of 
their anticompetitive tactics, there can never be any meaningful freedom of competition without 
some sort of government intervention.  Here, we have a marketplace that is being manipulated by 
the MVPDs and the intervention of the government by imposing a compulsory licensing scheme 
is the only way to rectify such bad acts. 
Congress must reform the current laws and extend compulsory licensing beyond its 
current meaning.  Throughout history, compulsory licensing has been used to rectify failing 
markets, today the MVPD industry is a failing market in that its sole purpose is to constrict 
competition.  Compulsory licensing in this sense must be extended to Internet television 
companies, specifically virtual cable providers  for both broadcast and non-broadcast 
programming.  This shift would allow for  Internet television companies to compete in the 
marketplace at designated  agreed upon  licensing fees set across the  board by industry leaders. 
Compulsory  licensing in this form would  dissipate the  ability of the MVPDs to         
manipulate  distribution  agreements  and pricing to lock out  virtual cable  television 
competitors.  
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C. Recommended Statutory Language 
The proposed language would read as follows: 
Compulsory Licensing Reform Act: Limitations on Exclusive Rights- Secondary Transmissions of 
Broadcast and Non-Broadcast Programming by a Multi-Channel Video Programming 
Distributor 
 
Secondary transmissions to the public by a multi-channel video programming distributor, 
of a performance or display of a work embodied in a primary transmission made by a broadcast 
or non-broadcast station licensed by the Federal Communications Commission shall be subject to 
statutory licensing set by industry, upon compliance with the requirements of subsection where 
the carriage of the signals comprising the secondary transmission are permissible under the rules, 
regulations, or authorizations of the Federal Communications Commission. 
 
A “multi-channel video programming distributor” should be construed broadly and is 
defined as: “an entity, whether physical or virtual, based in any State, territory, trust territory, or 
possession of United States, that in whole or in part receives signals transmitted by one or more 
television broadcast and non-broadcast stations licensed by the Federal Communications 
Commission, and makes secondary transmissions of such signals or programs by wires, cables, 
Internet, or other communications channels to subscribing members of the public who pay for 
such service. 
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VI. Conclusion 
Consumers deserve a marketplace that is free from collusion and anticompetitive 
practices. When government permits such actions to persist, the consumers are the ones who bear 
the burden of the greed perpetuated by today’s MVPDs. The most efficient actor, virtual cable 
companies must be given a chance to thrive. The government should intervene with an 
appropriate compulsory licensing scheme to rectify the wrongs of the MVPD industry.  
In the future Internet television providers, particularly virtual cable companies will 
mostly likely render MVPDs obsolete. Until then, the MVPD industry will fight to maintain 
dominance over the field, whatever the cost may be. 
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